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NOTICE 
The Politicization of Clarence Thomas 
Jagan Nicholas Ranjan 
CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY. By Andrew Peyton Thomas. 
San Francisco: Encounter Books. 2001. P. 661. $29.95. 
INTRODUCTION 
Perception often shapes memory. In particular, the way one 
perceives a noteworthy public figure often shapes that figure's histori­
cal legacy. For example, history largely remembers John Coltrane as 
one of the greatest jazz saxophone players of our time. His improvisa­
tional skill, innovative style, and mastery over his instrument all serve 
to classify him in the public memory as the ultimate jazz performer.1 
Yet, as the example of Coltrane might demonstrate, perception is 
unjustly deficient. Coltrane was not merely a great saxophone player; 
he was first and foremost a religious figure whose spirituality drove his 
creativity and manifested itself in prayerful reflections of "be bop."2 
The failure to perceive of Coltrane as a spiritual man, as opposed to a 
musical one, has led to an inadequate understanding of his music and, 
consequently, his legacy.3 
From Coltrane to the radically different Clarence Thomas, these 
very same issues of legacy and perception have arisen as legal scholars 
begin to assess the first decade of Justice Thomas's tenure on the 
Supreme Court. A recent proliferation of biographies,4 jurisprudential 
critiques,5 and symposia6 have all aspired to ascertain Justice Thomas's 
1. See Derek Kleinow, John Coltrane, at http://www.princeton.edu/-dkleinow/coltrane 
bio.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). For an insight into his performative abilities, see (or 
listen to) JOHN COLTRANE, BLUE TRANE (Blue Note Records 1957); JOHN COLTRANE, 
GIANT STEPS (Atlantic Records 1959): and JOHN COLTRANE, A LOVE SUPREME (Impulse! 
Records 1964). 
2. See BILL COLE, JOHN COLTRANE 160 (1976) (describing Coltrane's A Love Supreme 
as a prayer). 
3. See generally id. (arguing that Coltrane's music was a reflection of his spirituality). 
4. See ARMIN COOPER & JOHN L. COOPER, THE PRINCE AND THE PAUPER: THE CASE 
AGAINST CLARENCE THOMAS, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2001); 
ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY (2001). 
5. See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
CLARENCE THOMAS (2002); SAMUEL A. MARCOSSON, ORIGINAL SIN: CLARENCE THOMAS 
AND THE FAILURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATIVES (2002). 
2084 
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impact on judicial history and the law. Of this literature, the most 
comprehensive work on Thomas is Andrew Peyton Thomas's Clarence 
Thomas: A Biography.7 In his biography, Peyton Thomas8 undertakes 
a detailed examination of the life and legacy of Justice Thomas. 
Peyton Thomas begins by tracing Justice Thomas's slave roots 
(Chapter One) and argues that in order to "understand how Thomas 
became one of the great intellectual and political rebels in American 
history, one must recall, in the context of his life, the unique evils that 
he and his fellow black Americans surmounted with such great strug­
gle" (p. 7). This opening sets the thematic stage for the rest of the 
book - that is, Peyton Thomas paints the portrait of a man whose life 
and beliefs have been shaped largely by his views on race, personal 
instances of racism, and the struggle against racist stereotypes. From 
this portrait, Peyton Thomas ultimately concludes that Justice Thomas 
is a man deeply affected by his race, difficult to stereotype, and 
fiercely independent in thought (pp. 581, 592). 
Peyton Thomas traces Thomas's life from junior seminarian to 
Yale law student, from the chair of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to the Anita Hill hearings, and 
from his early years on the Supreme Court to his potential legacy. 
Peyton Thomas's thematic focus throughout continues to be on the 
6. For example, Regent University Law Review held a symposium paying tribute to Jus­
tice Thomas in the 1999-2000 academic year. Symposium, A Tribute to Justice Clarence 
Thomas, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 313 (1999-2000). Articles from that symposium included 
John D. Ashcroft, Justice Clarence Thomas: Reviving Restraint and Personal Responsibility, 
12 REGENT U. L. REV. 313 (1999-2000); Judge Pasco M. Bowman II, Justice Clarence Tho­
mas: A Brief Tribute, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 329 (1999- 2000); Thomas L. Jipping, "Judge 
Thomas is the First Choice": The Case for Clarence Thomas, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 397 
(1999-2000); Judge Edith H. Jones, Justice Thomas and the Voting Rights Act, 12 REGENT U. 
L. REV. 333 (1999-2000); Judge H. Brent McKnight, The Emerging Contours of Judge Tho­
mas's Textualism, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 365 (1999-2000); Edwin Meese Ill, The Jurispru­
dence of Clarence Thomas, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 349 (1999-2000); and Clarence Thomas, 
Personal Responsibility, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 317 (1999-2000). 
The American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law held a Clarence 
Thomas symposium in 2002. Symposium, Clarence Thomas After Ten Years, 10 AM. U. J. 
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 315 (2002). Articles from that symposium included Scott D. 
Gerber, "My Rookie Years Are Over" Clarence Thomas After Ten Years, 10 AM. U. J. 
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 343 (2002); Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism of Clarence 
Thomas: Anchoring the Supreme Court's Property Rights Jurisprudence to the Constitution, 
10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 351 (2002); Mark C. Niles, Clarence Thomas: The 
First Ten Years Looking for Consistency, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 327 (2002); 
and Stephen J. Wermiel, Clarence Thomas After Ten Years: Some Reflections, 10 AM. U. J. 
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 315 (2002). 
7. Andrew Peyton Thomas is an author whose works have appeared in the Wall Street 
Journal, Weekly Standard, and National Review. Clarence Thomas: A Biography is his third 
book. 
8. This Notice refers to the author as "Peyton Thomas" in order to avoid confusion be­
tween the biographer and his subject. 
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impact of race and the independence of Thomas's beliefs as he chroni­
cles each of these eras in Thomas's life.9 
Peyton Thomas's ultimate conclusion about Justice Thomas is, 
admittedly, not very bold. Peyton Thomas generally refrains from 
making many broad conclusions - undoubtedly to remain as objec­
tive a biographer as possible.10 Thus, the strength of his book is not in 
its arguments, but in its evidence. Peyton Thomas provides a compre­
hensive and extraordinarily detailed portrait of Justice Thomas. From 
this detailed framework, the reader is able to draw numerous infer­
ences regarding the public perception and early legacy of Justice 
Thomas. This Notice uses Peyton Thomas's book as a backdrop for 
adducing some of those inferences. 
This Notice argues that Justice Thomas's life is best understood by 
perceiving him as a political figure rather than as merely a jurist. Part I 
argues that Peyton Thomas's biography is valuable insofar as it pro­
vides a framework for the depiction of the political side of Justice 
Thomas. Part II then argues that once Justice Thomas is understood as 
a political figure, the controversial nature of both Thomas's jurispru­
dence and the scholarship surrounding his jurisprudence become 
explainable. In particular, Justice Thomas's seemingly divergent views 
on race can be perceived as partisan and his personal reliance on race 
9. For example, as a junior seminarian, Thomas was markedly influenced by the writings 
of Richard Wright - namely, Native Son and Black Boy. P. 92. According to Peyton Tho­
mas, Wright's works "reinforced Thomas's wrath toward racism," p. 92, while creating an 
inner tension between Thomas's strong beliefs in racial justice and his allegiance to the 
Catholic Church. Of his years in seminary, Thomas would explain, "I could not understand 
why the Catholic Church would suffer and permit segregation in its schools, in its parishes 
and in its churches. I could not understand why the Church did not speak out against some­
thing so obviously immoral, wrong and in violation of our own religious beliefs." Pp. 92-93. 
That tenuous balance between racial justice and religious faith would come undone in the 
aftermath of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s assassination. While at seminary, Thomas overheard 
one of his fellow seminarians in reference to Martin Luther King, Jr. say, "I'm glad they shot 
that nigger." P. 105. Thomas's journey on the road to the priesthood ended soon thereafter. 
Pp. 105-07. 
After his foray into the priesthood, Thomas left the South to attend Holy Cross on a 
scholarship. It was at Holy Cross, according to Peyton Thomas, where Thomas began to as­
sert his independence. P. 116. Further, the Black Power movement and its tone of independ­
ence and separatism resonated with Thomas while at Holy Cross. P. 117. Thomas became a 
self-described "radical." Thomas would later say, " 'I was truly on the left. . . .  there was no­
body on the other side of me.' Not only that, 'I was never a liberal . . .  I was a radical.' " P. 
120 . Although Peyton Thomas considers Thomas's views of his own politics as the "hyper­
bole of nostalgia and self-dramatization," p. 120, Thomas did immerse himself in the writings 
of his new favorite author, Malcolm X, during this time. P. 128. Although Thomas mellowed 
politically somewhat during the latter part of his time at Holy Cross, p. 129, these " 'years of 
rage,' " p. 129, show the side of Thomas that Peyton Thomas stresses throughout his book­
Thomas, the independent thinker, the courageous leader, and a man motivated by race. In 
fact, Peyton Thomas's ultimate conclusion of Justice Thomas largely mirrors the character 
depiction of the young radical Thomas at Holy Cross. 
10. Objectivity in writing about Thomas has been rare. See GERBER, supra note 5, at 3-
35 (describing the biased biographical literature written about Clarence Thomas); see also 
infra Section II.B. 
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as an opportunistic trump wielded for political convenience. 
Moreover, the critical rhetoric of Justice Thomas's opponents takes on 
a political flavor that is akin to the banter associated with an elected 
official and not a Supreme Court Justice. 
I. THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF CLARENCE THOMAS 
Traditionally, biography of a judicial figure discusses that judge's 
body of opinions and judicial philosophies. 11 Moreover, the arguably 
more provocative and legally relevant reviews of biography assess 
these sorts of jurisprudential critiques. 1 2  Yet, as this Part argues, the 
standard fare falls short of what is required in examining Clarence 
Thomas. This Part argues that Peyton Thomas's comprehensive 
examination of Thomas, apart from its jurisprudential utility, is crucial 
in understanding the perception of Clarence Thomas as a political 
figure13 in current sociopolitical and legal discourse. 
Three potential contributions exist to identify the value of Peyton 
Thomas's biography among the scholarship on Thomas. The first can 
be described as providing legal context. When examining the life of a 
public figure - in particular, a jurist - history is derived mostly from 
an objective record. It is a written historical record found within judi­
cial opinions and embedded in the law. The life experience of a judge, 
however, can shape his judicial opinions1 4 and thus provide a deeper 
contextual understanding1 5 of the objective record. 
In examining Andrew Peyton Thomas's biography of Justice 
Thomas, however, one finds a rather scant contextual analysis. Peyton 
Thomas's description of Justice Thomas's major opinions reads like a 
series of case briefs - summaries that only occasionally tie in the finer 
points of Justice Thomas's life or his originalist and natural-law-
11. See, e.g., supra note 5; see Richard A. Posner, Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
502, 512 (1995) (noting that the most common types of judicial biography are the ideologi­
cal). 
12. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Horrible Holmes, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1676 (2002) (re­
viewing ALBERT w. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND 
LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000)). 
13. The term "political figure" in the context of this Notice is defined in terms of the 
traditional views of the elected official - one who is a public persona, who has partisan or 
ideological leanings, who can operate shrewdly in attaining and maintaining office, etc. See, 
e.g., RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT NIXON (2001). 
14. See o.w. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) ("The life of the law has not 
been logic; it has been experience."). 
15. See 2 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS - FIRST SERIES 15 (1888) ("We are al­
ways coming up with the emphatic facts of history in our private experience and verifying 
them here. All history becomes subjective; in other words, there is properly no history; only 
biography."). 
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interpretive paradigms.16 Thus, Peyton Thomas, if striving to provide 
greater legal context to the opinions of Justice Thomas, fails to ac­
complish this purpose. 
Peyton Thomas's biography might then serve to satiate a sense of 
public curiosity.1 7 If a judicial figure has led an interesting life, then 
this seems like an appropriate reason to write a judicial biography.1 8 
As far as judicial life stories go, Clarence Thomas's - as a child of Jim 
Crow (Chapter Three), a controversial chairman of the EEOC, 1 9  and 
the target of publicized sexual harassment allegations (Chapters 
Twenty-One through Twenty-Three) - is arguably one of the more 
interesting. In particular, with the publicity of the Anita Hill hearings, 
the public's interest in Thomas was heightened.20 
Peyton Thomas's biography, however, is not a valuable work21 if 
viewed as providing a contextual understanding of the legal writings of 
Justice Thomas or satiating public curiosity over Thomas. Rather, 
Peyton Thomas's work provides the reader an opportunity to look 
past Thomas in his role as a jurist in order to uncover a wolf in sheep's 
clothing - Justice Thomas, the shrewd and effective politico. Thus, 
the value in Peyton Thomas's biography is not its legal analysis and 
criticism, but its detailed portrayal of Thomas that allows the reader to 
piece together a political portrait of Justice Thomas22 and the ensuing 
legal ramifications arising from that portrayal.23 
16. See, e.g., pp. 560-65. It should be emphasized that Peyton Thomas does at times dis­
cuss Thomas's experience and judicial philosophies in the course of Thomas's opinions. See, 
e.g., p. 500 (discussing Thomas's originalism). Yet, such references seem like mere after­
thoughts rather than the focus of discussion. For an example of a book designed to tie in 
Thomas's jurisprudence with his personal views and experiences, see GERBER, supra note 5. 
17. See Posner, supra note 11, at 512 (noting that curiosity is a plausible, yet rare, justifi­
cation for judicial biography). 
18. For example, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. See John F. Hagemann, Looking at 
Holmes, 39 S.D. L. REV. 433, 436 (1994) (describing Holmes's life as "multi-faceted" and 
"exceptionally full"); Posner, supra note 11, at 512 (describing Holmes as a man of "tower­
ing greatness" who "lived an interesting life"). 
19. See Jipping, supra note 6, at 429-30. 
20. See p. 434 (noting that the Anita Hill hearings brought extraordinarily high televi­
sion ratings). 
21. "Value" might be synonymous with "complete" when assessing biography. Unfortu­
nately, a complete biography may be an impossibility. See VIRGINIA WOOLF, ORLANDO: A 
BIOGRAPHY 202 (1990) ("A biography is considered complete if it merely accounts for six or 
seven selves, whereas a person may well have as many thousand."). The "completeness" of 
Peyton Thomas's biography - as the term is defined by Virginia Woolf - arguably is in the 
detail that allows the reader to discover the political "self" of Thomas. 
22. It should be noted from the outset that Peyton Thomas himself never draws the ex­
press conclusion of Thomas being a political figure. Rather, the detailed account of Tho­
mas's life, as portrayed by Peyton Thomas, provides for this independent conclusion. 
23. That is, the political portrait of Thomas still has legal import. As Part II infra argues, 
the political portrait informs Thomas's civil rights jurisprudence and how legal commenta­
tors engage Thomas's jurisprudence. 
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Four particular pieces of evidence, as proffered by Peyton Thomas, 
serve as the foundation for concluding Thomas to be a political figure. 
First, Peyton Thomas notes how maneuvering through the political 
climate was Thomas's forte. For example, Thomas excelled in the 
political climate of his various confirmation hearings. Peyton Thomas 
notes that during Thomas's EEOC confirmation hearing, Thomas's 
ability to spar with Senator Metzenbaum,24 his "fancy political foot­
work" during the questioning, and his behind-the-scenes lobbying of 
committee members were all incredibly shrewd maneuvers that led to 
his eventual confirmation (p. 284). Similarly, in his confirmation 
hearings on his appointment to the D.C. Court of Appeals, Thomas 
excelled under the partisan grilling by the Senate Judiciary Committee 
(pp. 324-25). And, of course, the ultimate example of Thomas's ability 
to engage in the political shenanigans of a confirmation process was 
his remarkable ability to resurrect his Supreme Court bid amidst the 
allegations of sexual harassment.25 In total, Peyton Thomas paints the 
picture of Thomas who succeeded26 amidst the political hostility of his 
confirmation hearings.27 
Second, Peyton Thomas focuses much of the book on Thomas's 
political occupations - as an assistant attorney general in Missouri,28 a 
staffer for Senator Danforth (pp. 177-80), head of the Office of Civil 
Rights (Chapter Twelve), and chairman of the EEOC (Chapters Thir­
teen-Fifteen) - again, with the purpose of showing how Thomas 
excelled in these executive settings. Thomas's. work at the EEOC, for 
example, demonstrated his apt executive ability to handle the agency's 
financial woes (p. 315) and to transform the agency's reputation from 
one of "criminality and ridicule" into "one of the jewels of the 
bureaucracy" (p. 325). While at the Office of Civil Rights, Thomas 
similarly gained the reputation as a motivator who inspired loyalty and 
managed skillfully (pp. 204-05). A fellow member at the Office of Civil 
Rights, Michael Middleton, commented on Thomas's managerial 
24. P. 283 ("This was a public dressing-down to which Metzenbaum was not accus­
tomed, and which he would never forget."); see infra Section II.A. 
25. See, e.g., p. 428. 
26. Although Thomas excelled in the confirmation setting, Thomas himself quite natu­
rally hated the process. See p. 285 ("The best thing that can be said about the confirmation 
process is, ' It's over,' Thomas remarked."). 
27. Compare Thomas's political acumen during the confirmation hearings to that of 
fellow conservative and former Supreme Court nominee, Robert Bork. While Thomas tip­
toed carefully around the abortion issue during his hearings, see, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Tho­
mas Softens His Remarks on Natural Law, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1991, at A3, available at 
1991 WL-WSJ 592653, Bork fell squarely into the trap of boldly engaging the issue at his 
hearings, and his Supreme Court nomination was subsequently quashed. See R. Gaull Sil­
berman, The Canonization of Anita Hill, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1992, at A20, available at 1992 
WL-WSJ 629405. 
28. See p. 149 (noting how Thomas was wooed by then-Attorney General John Dan­
forth and his message of, " 'Clarence, there is plenty of room at the top.' "). 
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prowess: "Paper moved; he set deadlines; he managed well. . . .  He was 
forceful in trying to find problems from an efficiency standpoint and a 
public policy perspective" (p. 205). This aptitude for administrative 
efficiency became one of Thomas's strengths once he went to the 
bench, as well (p. 465). Peyton Thomas's focus upon Thomas within 
the political realm prior to his career on the bench paints an image of 
Thomas as a man who excelled at both political gamesmanship as well 
as executive administration. 
Third, the political image of Thomas takes on public dimensions of 
celebrity and fame. That is, Justice Thomas is very much a public 
figure like that of a famous politician. This publicity stemmed initially 
from the coverage of the Anita Hill hearings.29 Although Peyton 
Thomas recounts that after the Anita Hill incident Thomas retreated 
into a shell of privacy,30 he does note that Thomas also later sought to 
redeem his reputation through a "campaign of public speeches" 
directed at friendly audiences (p. 485). As a result of this public 
persona, Thomas has achieved almost a celebrity status - having to 
dodge "fans" in public on one hand (p. 492), while also mingling in 
circles of celebrity that include Jerry Jones and Charles Barkley on the 
other (p. 499). This is not to say that other Supreme Court Justices are 
not public figures - only that they are public in very different ways 
than Thomas. Other Supreme Court Justices, while perhaps holding 
speaking engagements and judging moot court competitions,31 gener­
ally do not hold press conferences32 or have feature interviews in 
People magazine.3 3  Peyton Thomas demonstrates that Thomas, in 
many ways, seems like more of a cultural icon than a Supreme Court 
Justice.34 
Finally, the political portrait of Thomas is complete as Peyton 
Thomas notes the politically partisan nature of Thomas's judicial ide­
ology. Peyton Thomas first quotes several of Thomas's confidants who 
assert that the Anita Hill hearings jaded Thomas to the point of 
29. See p. 434 (noting that the Anita Hill hearings brought extraordinarily high televi­
sion ratings). 
30. Even when Thomas longed for privacy, it only stoked the public's interest all the 
more over his apparent enigma. See p. 560. 
31. For example, whereas many of his Supreme Court colleagues would judge moot 
court competitions or speak at the Ivy League law schools, Thomas refused. In fact, Thomas 
shied away from any involvement with his alma mater, Yale Law School. See pp. 565-66. 
32. See p. 501. 
33. See p. 457 (describing People magazine as "devoted largely to fawning profiles of 
and gossips about celebrities" and noting how the magazine made the exclusive Thomas in­
terview its feature story). 
34. See p. 492 (noting that the "confirmation hearings continued to resonate in the 
popular culture"); see also GERBER, supra note 5, at 14 (noting the literature dealing with 
the "cultural phenomenon that Clarence Thomas has become"). 
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affecting his judicial philosophy. That is, according to one such indi­
vidual, Thomas's thought process soon became: 
I'm gonna live long enough; I'm gonna stay on the Court long enough; 
and I'm gonna write the decisions that will get them. I don't think that's 
his conscious thinking, but that's his way of getting revenge .... He's very 
angry. It shouldn't affect his thinking on the Court, but it does.35 
Thus, if Thomas were not a true political conservative before the 
Anita Hill hearings, he became one soon thereafter (p. 470). Peyton 
Thomas does not press the partisan angle of Thomas's jurisprudence. 
Scott Gerber, however, in his book on Justice Thomas does conclude 
that empirically Thomas has been the most politically conservative 
member of the Rehnquist Court. 3 6  This is not to say that Thomas's 
opinions are unprincipled and merely politically driven;37 however, the 
distinct conservative outcome of the opinions coupled with Peyton 
Thomas's accounts of Thomas's ideological shift portray an image of 
Thomas that closely mirrors a partisan, political figure. 
Peyton Thomas provides the proof for the political pudding. 
Peyton Thomas shows how Justice Thomas excelled in the political 
climate of his confirmation hearings and agency work. He further 
describes Thomas as a remarkably public persona - a sort of judicial 
celebrity. Finally, Thomas is shown to have conservative, ideological 
leanings that have manifested themselves along very consistent case 
outcome lines. The end result is that from Peyton Thomas's eviden­
tiary framework, this Notice deduces the independent conclusion that 
Justice Thomas is a political man. Although perhaps an obvious 
conclusion at first glance,38 its ramifications in how one perceives 
"Thomas, the Jurist" are potentially groundbreaking. 
35. P. 469; see also p. 479 (quoting one commentator who opined that Thomas's first 
year of jurisprudence on the Court served to " 'freeze his antipathy toward the left' "). 
36. GERBER, supra note 5, at 212. Gerber describes the data as indicating 
that Justice Thomas was strongly conservative in every issue area during each of his first five 
terms on the Supreme Court. The data further indicate that Justice Thomas was typically the 
most conservative member of the Rehnquist Court in every issue area during each of the 
terms and that, in the aggregate, Justice Thomas was the most conservative Rehnquist Court 
justice. 
Id. at 212-15 & tbl.3. In fact, one of Gerber's ultimate conclusions is the characterization of 
Thomas's jurisprudence as "political" in part. Id. at 196. 
37. Cf John 0. Calmore, Airing Dirty Laundry: Disputes Among Privileged Blacks -
from Clarence Thomas to "The Law School Five," 46 How. L.J. 175, 180 (2003) (arguing that 
Thomas's jurisprudence masquerades as impartial). 
38. Or perhaps it should not be so obvious. The very purpose of Article III judges is for 
political insulation. See STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19-20 (3d ed. 1996) (noting 
the "existence of a realm of 'law' immune from 'politics' "). Moreover, Justice Thomas him­
self stated unequivocally that he appropriately left behind the political world and all political 
involvement once confirmed. P. 586. Yet, this divorce from political involvement does not 
foreclose the perception of Thomas as a political persona and the characterization of many of 
Thomas's views as politically opportunistic. See infra Part II. 
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II. RACE AND RHETORIC: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF POLITICIZING 
CLARENCE THOMAS 
Once Justice Thomas is seen as a political figure, key perceptions 
regarding his judicial tenure are revealed. This Part examines two such 
revelations. Section II.A examines Justice Thomas's views on race and 
argues that a plausible way to explain them is in political terms. 
Section II.B then looks at the vitriolic criticism voiced by Justice 
Thomas's opponents and argues that such rhetoric becomes more 
understandable if viewed as a kind of political tenor rather than a 
judicial one. 
A. Undertones and Overtures: Perceptions of Race 
As aforementioned, a major theme of Peyton Thomas's biography 
is the role of race in Justice Thomas's life.39 Peyton Thomas describes 
Thomas as a man deeply affected by racism of the past (p. 521 ); a man 
who early on embraced the angry B lack Pantheresque views on race 
relations (p. 117); a man who then retreated from those views and 
turned hostile against affirmative action once his own credentials were 
questioned (pp. 141-43); and a man who, while both in the political 
and legal realms, has taken a very conservative stance on civil rights.40 
In spite of this retreat from civil rights activism, Peyton Thomas 
describes Thomas as a man striving for racial equality.41 At first glance, 
Thomas's views seem paradoxical. On one hand, Thomas cares deeply 
about racial justice42 while fully embracing his own race.43 On the other 
39. See supra Introduction. 
40. See, e.g., pp. 286, 516-17. 
41. See p. 550. 
42. Thomas's own words prove as much. See id. (quoting a Thomas speech, " 'It pains 
me deeply, or more deeply than any of you can imagine, to be perceived by so many mem­
bers of my race as doing them harm . . . .  All the sacrifice, all the long hours of preparation 
were to help, not hurt.' "). In public remarks, Thomas exhorted blacks to take up the cause 
of racial justice by saying, 
A tremendous burden has been placed upon the righteous black man of today to rise above 
the wrongs done to him and help right America. Because of the history of suffering of black 
people - and there is redemption in suffering - black people have a critical role in bringing 
to fruition the promise of 1776 ... . We must have more strength than they had to do what is 
right. 
P. 592. Similarly, Thomas encouraged black college students at Tuskegee, absent a formal 
invitation, by remarking, 
Many of you are the first in your family to go to college. I was there. Some of you have 
grown up in rural areas. I was there. Some of you were raised by one or neither parent. I was 
there. Some of you have barely or never seen your father. I was there. Some of you only 
have one pair of shoes. I was there. Some of you will be heavily in debt when you leave col­
lege . . . .  I finished paying my student loans two years ago. So I was there. Some of you may 
be frustrated. Some of you may be angry. Some of you may be confused. I was there . . . .  I 
am no better than you-all. I'm no smarter than you-all. I'm no more talented than you-all. 
I've never been No. 1 in my class. 
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hand, Thomas eschews the civil rights initiatives supported by the 
African-American community - in particular, affirmative action, 
quotas, and busing.44 Upon further review, two plausible explanations 
exist to clarify the conundrum. 
First, Peyton Thomas's own explanation is that Thomas is a man 
who simply cannot be stereotyped. His ultimate conclusion reinforces 
this: Thomas is a black man who cares about his race and Thomas is 
an independent thinker whose very raison d'etre is to show that 
African Americans' views on civil rights need not be singular (p. 497). 
Justice Thomas, for example, believes that affirmative action does 
more harm than good for minorities.45 He believes in values like hard 
work and personal responsibility46 and believes that disadvantaged 
minorities - like himself - can attain any goal by utilizing these 
values rather than relying on their race for free and stigmatized hand­
outs.47 Peyton Thomas's explanation of Thomas on race makes sense. 
That is, it fits coherently with the picture of "Thomas, the independent 
thinker" that he paints. 
Peyton Thomas's explanation, although holding currency, is 
incomplete. Although the conclusion of Thomas as an independent 
thinker who cares about racial justice is probably accurate, it does not 
entirely fit with the portrait of the political Thomas deduced from 
Peyton Thomas's depiction. Justice Thomas's beliefs on race should 
Pp. 501-02; see also p. 487 (recounting Thomas encouraging black youths in Atlanta); p. 552 
(recounting Thomas encouraging black students in Denver); p. 550 (citing Thomas preaching 
the message of complete racial integration). 
43. Seep. 550 (quoting a Thomas speech," 'Despite some of the nonsense that has been 
said about me by those who should know better, and so much nonsense, or some of which 
subtracts from the sum total of human knowledge, despite this all, I am a man, a black man, 
an American.' "). 
44. See p. 165 (noting how "Thomas became a vociferous critic of liberal remedies pro­
posed in Congress and the federal courts to ameliorate race relations. He fulminated against 
the civil rights agenda of most black politicians and interest groups such as the NAACP: 
busing, quotas, affirmative action"); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S 70, 114-38 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2350-65 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
45. Thomas notes that affirmative action programs: 
can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination. So-called "be­
nign"discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable handi­
caps, minorities cannot compete with them without their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, 
such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment 
among those who believe that they have been wronged by the government's use of race. 
These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop 
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are "entitled" to preferences. 
See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
46. See Thomas, supra note 6. 
47. P. 517 (quoting Thomas's Adarand concurrence in which he refers to affirmative ac­
tion as" 'programs [which] stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them 
to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are 'entitled' to preferences' "). 
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instead be explained in political terms. Two points serve to illustrate 
this characterization. 
First, Justice Thomas's jurisprudence on race departs from the 
originalism that undergirds most of his jurisprudence (p. 517). For 
example, as Peyton Thomas notes, Thomas in Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena48 relied on natural-law principles of the Declaration of 
Independence rather than an originalist construction to voice opposi­
tion to an affirmative action program (p. 516). Peyton Thomas's 
explanation is that Justice Thomas realized that "[a]pplying origi­
nalism to the Fourteenth Amendment would have required Thomas to 
admit that the Constitution was, in a fundamental sense, racist in con­
ception" - something Thomas would not and could not do (p. 517). 
Yet, what Peyton Thomas fails to realize is that the result of Thomas's 
paradigmatic departure in civil rights cases49 was the politicization of 
Thomas's jurisprudence. In essence, Thomas's jurisprudence was no 
longer intellectually consistent along originalist lines; instead, it fell 
right down partisan lines. The conservative right applauded Thomas 
while the liberal left decried him.50 Thomas's departure from origi­
nalism, even if based on sincere personal beliefs about race, the 
Constitution, and natural law, cemented a perception of Thomas as a 
political actor.51 This perception is significant in terms of the discourse 
48. 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
49. Affirmative action cases like Adarand illustrate most vividly the perceived politi­
cized civil rights jurisprudence of Thomas. Yet, other civil rights cases are also illustrative. 
For example, Thomas's concurring opinion in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994), a Voting 
Rights Act case, was perceived as a politically conservative anthem and a liberal blow. See 
GERBER, supra note 5, at 94. In his Holder concurrence, Thomas called into question the 
entire edifice of the Court's voting-rights jurisprudence. See id. at 87. Thomas argued that 
the Voting Rights Act did not cover second-generation claims and that "as far as the Act is 
concerned, an effective vote is merely one that has been cast and fairly counted." Holder, 
512 U.S. at 919 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also GERBER, supra note 5, at 87. It is arguable 
that Thomas remained intellectually faithful to his usual paradigmatic preference of textual­
ism. See id. at 89. Yet, Justice Stevens in dissent branded Thomas's concurrence as a "radi­
cal" reading of the Act, Holder, 512 U.S. at 963 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and essentially ac­
cused Thomas of reading his own policy preferences into the Act. Id. at 966 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Whether or not �tevens was correct in his accusation, Thomas's concurrence was 
met with politically partisan praise and criticism - evidence that many at least perceived 
Stevens to be right that Thomas's opinion was policy-guided. See GERBER, supra note 5, at 
94. 
50. GERBER, supra note 5, at 102-03. 
51. This Notice only argues that the perception of Thomas's race jurisprudence has been 
political; it does not argue that Thomas has in fact been motivated by unprincipled, political 
reasons. This latter argument - as with most forms of motive review - is simply too 
speculative and therefore too difficult to make convincingly one way or the other. Peyton 
Thomas refers to commentators who believe Thomas has adopted a bitterly partisan juris­
prudence. See pp. 469, 479. On the other hand, Scott Douglas Gerber makes an argument 
that one can classify Thomas's jurisprudence on race as a principled "liberal originalism" 
and an extension of Harlan's view of a colorblind Constitution, GERBER, supra note 5, at 
109, 193, or in the context of voting-rights cases, as "dedicated textualis[m]." Id. at 89. Yet, 
then again, Gerber argues that most of Thomas's jurisprudence - particularly his civil rights 
jurisprudence - mirrors the political beliefs that Thomas expressed as a member of the ex-
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surrounding Thomas's jurisprudence.52 Peyton Thomas's failure to ac­
count for it in his explanation of Thomas's civil rights views is a serious 
oversight. 
Second, from the description of Thomas's life by Peyton Thomas, 
Justice Thomas can be seen as opportunistically wielding his race as a 
trump for political convenience. Peyton Thomas never draws this con­
clusion;53 however, he lays out enough evidence for a persuasive cir­
cumstantial case. For instance, during Thomas's first EEOC confirma­
tion hearing, Thomas was questioned on his civil rights stance and his 
apparent lack of support from the civil rights community (p. 282-83). 
Thomas responded, not by discussing his position on the issues, but by 
relying on his experience as a child of Jim Crow. He stated: 
Well, all I have to offer is the fact that I grew up under segregation ... 
and I was the only black in my high school for 2 years of high school. 
And I am not used to walking in step with anybody because I was the 
only one of my kind, normally, wherever I was. (p. 283) 
Thomas made his point by relying on his race and was subsequently 
able to gain confirmation, 
Similarly, Thomas responded to the Anita Hill allegations at his 
Supreme Court hearings by again relying on his race as a rebuke to the 
Committee's investigation. He memorably stated: 
And from my standpoint, as a black American, as far as I am concerned, 
it is high-tech lynching for uppity blacks who in any way deign to think 
for themselves, to do for themselves, to have different ideas, and it is a 
message that, unless you kow-tow to an old order, this is what will hap­
pen to you, you will be lynched, destroyed, caricatured by a committee of 
the U.S. Senate, rather than hung from a tree. (p. 428) 
· 
Thomas would later reprise his "high-tech lynching speech" during the 
hearings as he discussed the history of lynchings and its relationship to 
sexual accusations against the black man (p. 435). According to 
ecutive branch. See id. at 198 ("Justice Thomas is, in short, merely an especially fascinating 
example of the realist maxim that judges read their policy preferences into the law they are 
interpreting."). In the end, it is too difficult to definitively classify Thomas's reasons, as op­
posed to the perception of Thomas's reasons, as political. In any event, as this Notice argues, 
perception matters more. That is, most Thomas commentators refuse to dig beneath the po­
litical perception and engage his jurisprudence regardless of the political perception. See in­
fra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. 
52. See infra Section II.B. 
53. In fact, Peyton Thomas would likely disagree, as most of the. book is spent revealing 
Thomas's personal and genuine experiences involving his race. See, e.g., p. 105 (recounting a 
racist remark in the wake of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s assassination and the significant im­
pact it' had on Thomas); p. 123 (noting Thomas's disgust with a disparate punishment leveled 
at some black students while at Holy Cross and Thomas's "act of solidarity" in withdrawing 
from school with fellow Black Students' Union members); p. 141 (noting that "Thomas 
would later say that the worst experience of his life was when whites at Yale told him he was 
admitted there only because of racial quotas" and that the stigma of affirmative action called 
Thomas's accomplishments into question). 
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Peyton Thomas, the high-tech lynching speech and its reprise would 
prove decisive as a turning point in the confirmation battle (p. 434). 
The move by Thomas to racialize the hearings demonstrated a 
sense of political shrewdness; in effect, he changed the tone of the 
hearings from a sexual harassment investigation a racist manhunt for 
Thomas by fiendish political lynchers.54 As even Peyton Thomas 
admits, the effect on the public was unmistakable - the African 
American community embraced Thomas in the common sentiment of, 
"'I don't think blacks should be against blacks' " (p. 448). Further, 
according to Peyton Thomas, "In the end, the proud nonconformist 
who bucked racial solidarity would find his political salvation in the 
black community" (p. 448). 
Peyton Thomas, although never drawing the conclusion himself, 
provides instances of Thomas wielding his race to serve certain politi­
cal ends. This is not to say that Thomas did so disingenuously or even 
consciously. Yet, if image is really everything, the perception of 
Thomas using his race as a political trump did resonate with the public 
and a political perception of Justice Thomas was given further 
credence. This perception, coupled with Thomas's distinct jurispru­
dence in race cases, demonstrates that Thomas views and uses race 
like the traditional political figure. As Section 11.B argues, this percep­
tion, as partially constructed by Thomas, has been his public undoing. 
B. Off-Color Rhetoric: Fit for a King Yet Aimed at a Judge 
The criticism voiced by Thomas's opponents against him has been 
largely preposterous.55 The attacks have often been unreasoned, 
bitterly partisan, and grossly propagandized.56 Furthermore, the tenor 
of the criticism has been deplorably personal - in the form of ad 
hominem attacks and often racist name-calling.57 At first glance, 
Clarence Thomas looks like the whipping boy for the left - the lone 
opportunity for the left to have license to be racist without ever 
54. Claude McKay's poem, The Lynching, vividly depicts an image-laden parallel to that 
of Thomas's high-tech lynching: a sexualized accusation followed by an opportunistic and 
shockingly joyous lynching. 
The ghastly body swaying in the sun. 
The women thronged to look, but never a one 
Showed sorrow in her eyes of steely blue. 
And little lads, lynchers that were to be, 
Danced round the dreadful thing in fiendish glee. 
See CLAUDE MCKAY, THE LYNCHING, SPRING IN NEW HAMPSHIRE AND OTHER POEMS 11 
(1920). 
55. See, e.g., infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
56. See, e.g., infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
57. See, e.g., infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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engaging in Thomas's actual ideas.58 Yet, once the politicized version 
of Thomas is revealed, the critics' attacks - albeit still inexcusable in 
tenor - become easier to explain. Section II.B proceeds in three parts 
by first examining specific anti-Thomas remarks; second, identifying 
and critiquing two commentators' plausible explanations for the 
rhetoric; and finally, arguing that the critical rhetoric is a direct result 
of Thomas's politicization. 
Peyton Thomas provides many examples of the critical rhetoric 
aimed at Justice Thomas. For instance, he recounts how critics often 
refer to Thomas as a "Scalia clone" due to the fact that both 
frequently vote together.59 Moreover, he notes the New York Times 
reaction to Justice Thomas's infamous Hudson v. McMillian60 dissent 
where the Times labeled Thomas "The Youngest, Cruelest Justice."61 
He then mentions numerous personal attacks on Thomas, ranging 
from critics calling him "bizarre" (p. 479) to "Uncle Tom Justice" 
(p. 519). He also discusses the anti-Thomas book Strange Justice where 
Thomas is termed a bastard who grew up in a "shack" (p. 503). 
In addition to these examples listed by Peyton Thomas, numerous 
others exist. One law professor referred to Thomas in the wake of 
Thomas's Hudson dissent, as " 'about as warm to the plight of criminal 
suspects and prisoners as that frosty can of Coke on his desk at 
E.E.O.C.' "62 A Playboy article dubbed Thomas, "the Angriest Man 
58. See John A. Foster-Bey, Supreme Justice: Ten Years of Justice Thomas - and 
Thomas Bashing, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 18, 2002, at http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
comment/comment-foster-beyl01802.asp. 
59. Pp. 499-500. Peyton Thomas, however, argues that such a moniker is patently unfair. 
He notes how empirically Souter and Breyer actually vote together more often than Scalia 
and Thomas. Id. 
60. 503 U.S. 1 (1992). Hudson was a case about a prisoner who had been beaten by 
prison guards and had brought a § 1983 suit claiming a violation of his Eighth Amendment 
rights against cruel and unusual punishment. Id at 4. The Court held that the guard's use of 
force was objectively and subjectively excessive and thus constituted cruel and unusual pun­
ishment. Id. at 8-10. Thomas, in dissent, argued that the "use of force that causes only insig­
nificant harm to a prisoner may be immoral, it may be tortious, it may be criminal, and it 
may even be remediable under other provisions of the Federal Constitution, but it is not 
cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 18 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Yet, Thomas went further 
by calling the Court's Eighth Amendment precedents into question, arguing that the 
amendment did not apply in the prison context. Rather, the history of the amendment had 
shown its application only where "tortious punishments [had been) meted out by statutes or 
sentencing judges." Id. at 18-19. 
61. Justice Thomas himself was shocked by the media's'reaction. He would later state, 
I must note in passing that I can't help but wonder if some of my critics can read. One opin­
ion that is trotted out for propaganda, for the propaganda parade, is my dissent in [Hudson]. 
The conclusion reached by the long arms of the critics is that I supported the beating of pris­
oners in that case . . . .  How can one extrapolate these larger conclusions from the narrow 
question before the Court is beyond me, unless. of course, there's a special segregated mode 
of analysis. 
P. 479. 
62. GERBER, supra note 5, at 28 (quoting professor Craig Bradley). 
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on the Supreme Court."63 An article in Emerge, the self-proclaimed 
"Black America's Newsmagazine," called Thomas, "Uncle Thomas: 
Lawn Jockey of the Far Right" and displayed a caricature of Thomas 
shining Justice Scalia's shoes.64 An ACLU of Hawaii board member 
refused to invite Thomas to speak, arguing it would be akin to "invit­
ing Hitler to come speak on the rights of Jews." 65 Another commenta­
tor actually wished physical harm upon Thomas by stating, "I hope his 
wife feeds him lots of eggs and butter and he dies early, like many 
black men do, of heart disease."66 Admittedly, some critics attempt to 
critically engage Thomas's ideas,67 yet the aforementioned examples of 
petty and hurtful ad hominem attacks dwarf those tidbits of intellec­
tual discourse.68 
Although Peyton Thomas fails to explain the reason for such a 
vitriolic discourse in judging Thomas, other commentators do. Donna 
Brazile, for instance, argues that Thomas's critics are motivated by his 
failure to properly fill the shoes of Justice Thurgood Marshall - a 
liberal and a strong intellectual figure.69 Since Thomas does not step in 
line with the liberal establishment on civil rights issues, he has been 
crucified by that establishment.70 On the other hand, Scott Douglas 
Gerber hypothesizes that most people judge "Justice Thomas" as they 
judged "Nominee Thomas."71 That is, most people take issue with 
Thomas down partisan lines for reasons stemming largely from the 
Anita Hill hearings.72 
Both Brazile's and Gerber's explanations ring true in part. Yet, 
Brazile's theory only explains why the critics have voiced opposition 
to Thomas; it fails to explain why that criticism has taken on such a 
personal tenor. Other prominent African Americans who have been 
associated with a legacy and have taken conservative civil rights posi­
tions certainly have been criticized, but not with the widespread, 
63. Id. at 30. 
64. Id. at 31. The Editor later apologized for being too compassionate with the lawn­
jockey imagery (and also with a previous caricature of Thomas wearing an Aunt Jemima 
handkerchief). Id.; see also p. 549. 
65. Kevin Merida & Michael A. Fletcher, Supreme Discomfort, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 
2002, (Magazine), at 11. 
66. Id. at 10. 
67. See, e.g., Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? "Gangsta," Culture, Clarence Thomas, and 
Afrocentric Academies, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308 (2000). 
68. See, e.g., Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., Ask Why His Black Critics Are Angry at Justice Tho­
mas, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1994, at A27 ("None of Thomas's disappointed critics went be­
yond ad hominem comments to meet his arguments (in Holder v. Hall] head-on."). 
69. Foster-Bey, supra note 58. 
70. Id. 
71. GERBER, supra note 5, at 192. 
72. Id. at 33-34, 192. 
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persistent, and harsh language of personal animus directed at Tho­
mas.73 Similarly, Gerber's explanation is insufficient. Although it 
seems right in part, it tends to overemphasize the impact of the Anita 
Hill hearings. People undoubtedly still judge Thomas as the "Nominee 
Thomas," but not solely because of what happened at the hearings. 
Rather, the perception built at the hearings matters only as to its role 
in constructing the politicized Thomas. 
The political explanation of Thomas best explains the flavor of the 
rhetoric. Thomas has simply been attacked in the same manner as any 
public political figure. B razile's race explanation and Gerber's partisan 
explanation both are components to this formula. That is, Thomas's 
views on race and the partisanship associated with his confirmation 
and his jurisprudence partially serve to comprise the Political Thomas. 
Yet, as this Notice has argued, Thomas's own public persona and his 
own use of race as a political trump have helped to build his political 
image.74 The result is an attack that can be described as "presidential" 
- Nixonian in degree of vitriol, 7 5  Clintonian in terms of character 
assassination,76 and parallel to George W. Bush on questions of intel­
lectual capacity.77 Similarly, Thomas's responses to these "presiden­
tial" attacks have often been couched in political terms. To illustrate, 
Thomas, at a press conference - again, a highly unusual and public 
event for a Supreme Court Justice - declared to a group of black 
73. For example, Roy Innis, the national director of the Congress on Racial Equality 
("CORE"), inherited a legacy organization in 1968 with a rich history of civil rights involve­
ment. CORE staged the first sit-ins in Chicago; CORE members were the first to go on free­
dom rides in the South; the three civil rights workers murdered in Mississippi in 1964 were 
all CORE members. Needless to say, CORE is a legacy civil rights institution and arguably 
as important as the NAACP in the civil rights struggle. See Gregory Kane, It's Time 
to Honor the Alternative to Jackson, Sharpton as Leaders, BALT. SUN, Jan. 26, 2003, available 
at http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/balmd.kane26jan26,0,3825134.column?coll=bal-home­
columnists. Yet, under the leadership of Roy Innis, CORE has eschewed affirmative action 
and taken more conservative stances on civil rights positions. See Niger Innis & Roy Innis, 
Ending Race-Based Politics, AMERICAN OUTLOOK, Summer 2000, at 45. Rather than getting 
berated by the civil rights establishment for abandoning a legacy, Innis has been honored for 
his part in the struggle. See Kane, supra, available at http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/ 
balmd.kane26jan26,0,3825134.column?coll=bal-home-columnists. 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34; Section II.A. 
75. See Patrick J. Buchanan, Yes, Watergate Was a Coup D 'Etat, WATERGATE.INFO, 
June 17, 1997, at http://www.watergate.info/analysis/buchanan.shtml (positing that the at­
tacks on Nixon were motivated by hatred). 
76. Compare Clinton's famous, "l did not have sexual relations with that woman" to the 
Senator Hatch/Clarence Thomas exchange at his confirmation hearings (Hatch: "Did you 
ever say in words or substance something like there is a pubic hair in my coke?" Thomas: 
"No, Senator"). P. 431. 
77. Compare the image of an intellectually deficient Bush, see Eric Alterman, Left in 
Shambles. (Ralph Nader's failed bid for presidency still had impact), NATION, Nov. 27, 2000 
(noting the media script during the campaign of portraying Bush as dumb), available at 2000 
WL 1 7719128, with the description of Thomas as a "clone" of Scalia. P. 499. 
2100 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101 :2084 
journalists, "I am not an Uncle Tom."78 He could very well have been 
saying, "I am not a crook." Thomas, in way of response, consciously 
adopted the same political rhetoric that had been heaped upon him.79 
Thus, rather than explaining the strange critical tenor surrounding 
Justice Thomas as an Anita Hill result or a partisan manifestation, it is 
more accurate to describe it80 as politically flavored and directed at a 
political figure. 
In the end, the legal and historical implications of this politicized 
rhetoric are disheartening. Thomas's jurisprudence - particularly his 
civil rights jurisprudence - is rarely engaged and hastily dismissed. 
The perception of a politicized Thomas obscures any value of his judi­
cial philosophy. For example, Thomas's civil rights jurisprudence 
could easily be described as a form of "liberal originalism" or classi­
cally liberal. 81 Instead, it is dismissed as "ideologically driven partisan 
jurisprudence that masquerades as judicial impartiality." 82 Other 
Supreme Court Justices, who have been described as deciding cases 
based on political reasons,83 have nonetheless had their bodies of 
opinions assessed on the merits.84 Yet, with Thomas, his political 
78. P. 501 (Peyton Thomas describes the statement quite appropriately as "an unfortu­
nate Nixonian formulation"). 
79. Peyton Thomas recounts a speech of Thomas's that demonstrates the Justice's con-
sciousness of the rhetoric. Thomas stated, 
"In my humble opinion, those who come to engage in debates of consequence, and who 
challenge accepted wisdom, should expect to be treated badly." . . .  "Even if one has a valid 
position, and is intellectually honest, he has to anticipate nasty responses aimed at the mes­
senger rather than the argument." "[A)ctive citizens are often subjected to truly vile attacks; 
they are branded as mean-spirited, racist. Uncle Tom, homophobic, sexist, etc." 
P. 590. 
80. To reiterate, it is accurate to describe it as political, not to rationalize or justify it as 
such. 
81. GERBER, supra note 5, at 193-94. 
82. See Calmore, supra note 37. 
83. Look no further than to the entire Rehnquist Court in Bush v. Gore, 53 1 U.S. 98 
(2000). See Peter Gabel, What It Really Means to Say "Law is Politics": Political History and 
Legal Argument in Bush v. Gore, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (2002) ("By going so far 
beyond the legitimate limits of constitutional interpretation, the Court made transparent 
what is usually mystified - the political nature of all legal reasoning."). Bw see Erwin 
Chemerinsky, How Should We Think Abow Bush v. Gore?, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 6 (2002) 
("! truly believe that each of the nine Justices deeply believed that he or she was making a 
ruling on the law, not on partisan grounds."). 
84. Again, using the example of the Rehnquist Court in Bush v. Gore, the Court's per 
curiam opinion and various concurrences and dissents all came down along Republican v. 
Democrat grounds. See Tony Au th, Cartoon, Why They Don 't Want Cameras in the Supreme 
Court, L.A .  TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at B9. Yet the decision, ,apart from its fairly obvious parti­
san foundation, has been thoroughly engaged on its legal merits. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Su­
preme Democra cy: Bush v. Gore Redux, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 23 (2002); Steve J. Mulroy, 
Lemonade from Lemons: Can Advocates Convert Bush v. Gore into a Vehicle for Reform? 9 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 357 (2002); Louis Michael Seidman, Democracy and Le­
gitimation: A Response to Professor Guinier, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 77 (2002). 
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perception almost acts to disrobe him entirely of his role as a jurist, as 
commentators rarely dig beneath the perception85 or, as with other 
politically behaving Justices, hold constant the legal-realist notion that 
policy often is interwoven with constitutional interpretation.86 
Thomas's body of opinions - particularly his concurrences and 
dissents - lose their historical value once Thomas is dismissed as a 
politico. Thomas has been vociferous in dissent - while critics might 
deem many of these opinions as largely irrelevant, one lone commen­
tator argues that they constitute "a lasting legacy" appealing to the 
"intelligence of a future day."87 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
there remains Thomas's personal legacy. As history has largely failed 
to recognize John Coltrane as a spiritual icon due to the obvious per­
ception of him as purely a musician,88 likewise, the politicized percep­
tion of Thomas could inaccurately shape his own legacy. History will 
unlikely remember Thomas as a fiercely independent legal theorist 
and a courageous moral agent, as Peyton Thomas describes Thomas's 
potential legacy (p. 592). Instead, Thomas unfortunately may well be 
remembered in the colorful and politicized language of his detractors: 
as "a Negrophobic, self-loathing [historical] blip."89 
85. Thomas's concurrence in Holder v. Hall, a Voting Rights Act case, again proves il­
lustrative. See supra note 49. Thomas's concurrence was perhaps the lengthiest concurrence 
in Supreme Court history. P. 495. His analysis was principled in that he remained faithful to 
the statutory paradigm of textualism. GERBER, supra note 5, at 89. Although Justice Stevens 
argued Thomas's reading of the Act was radical, Holder, 512 U.S. at 963 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting), it was a well-reasoned, novel, and passionate reading of the text. Pp. 495-97. 
Despite this, critics - presumably dismissive due to the conservative outcome of the concur­
rence - initially attacked the opinion by engaging in ad hominem attacks against Thomas 
rather than criticizing the opinion and its reasoning on the substantive merits. See Yoder, 
supra note 68, at A27 ("None of Thomas's disappointed critics went beyond ad hominem 
comments to meet his arguments [in Holder v. Hall] head-on."). Arguably, beneath the 
sands of political perception laid the solid legal foundation of Holder shamefully untouched. 
As Holder and its scholarship demonstrate, the political perception of Thomas acts effec­
tively as a barrier, preventing an accurate and thorough understanding of his jurisprudence. 
Ultimately, this is the concern with politicizing Thomas. 
86. See Christopher Wolfe, The Senate's Power to Give "Advice and Consent " in Judicial 
Appointments, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 355, 366 (1999) ("The predominant lens through which 
legal history is viewed today is legal realism, which, in varying degrees according to its more 
or less extreme forms, holds that judges are basically 'politicians in robes.' "). 
87. See David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court's Rediscovery 
of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 343 n.14 ( 1996): 
Even if Justice Thomas' views do not sway the other Justices on the Court in the near future, 
his dissenting and concurring opinions constitute a lasting legacy. He may be regarded as 
one of those "prophets with honor" who appeal to " 'the brooding spirit of the law, to the in­
telligence of a future day' " and who "stir the sensibilities and prod the conscience of the 
country, eventually leading the Court - which is, in a true serise, the custodian of the coun­
try's conscience - 'to correct the error into which [he] believes the Court to have been be­
trayed.' " 
88. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
89. Barry Saunders, No Need to Protest Thomas, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), 
Mar. 8, 2002, at Bl. 
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CONCLUSION 
Peyton Thomas, in his biography, examines Thomas's life in great 
detail and attempts to explain the man as independent in both spirit as 
well as in legal thought. Yet, the strength of Peyton Thomas's book 
lies not in this conclusion, but rather in the detail. From his compre­
hensive biography, several major inferences can be drawn. As this 
Notice has argued, Peyton Thomas provides the evidence for making a 
compelling case that Justice Thomas has been entirely politicized in 
perception. Thomas's past experiences, his jurisprudence, and his 
views on race all are part of his political make-up. In addition, the bit­
ter rhetoric aimed at Thomas becomes more understandable if viewed 
as the language of petty political discourse as opposed to engaging 
legal critique. 
Perhaps a final question then is: Will it ever be possible for 
Thomas to be de-politicized? Peyton Thomas, noting recent critics' 
eschewal of the "Scalia Clone" moniker and the recognition of 
Thomas's clearly independent jurisprudence, suggests as much (p. 
581). And although Thomas can never change his race and he remains 
steadfast in his politically conservative views on civil rights, a recent 
glimpse of tolerance - or perhaps the white flag of surrender - by 
the liberal civil rights community suggests that the process of 
de-politicization has already begun:90 Yet, only time will tell if the 
process will run to completion and Thomas can be viewed as purely a 
judicial figure and not as a political one. 
90. GERBER, supra note 5, at 34 (quoting NAACP president Kwesi Mfume as saying, "I 
think we must end the Clarence Thomas fixation in our community and use that energy to 
change things around us"). 
